The Vanishing Mango: Understanding the MangoFarmSOL Exit Scam

php Editor Baicao will take you through the entire process of MangoFarmSOL exiting the scam. Recently, the MangoFarmSOL project suddenly announced its closure, and many investors faced losses. This incident has aroused widespread attention and heated discussion. What is the truth hidden behind it? Let us uncover this mystery together and explore the story behind the disappearing mango.

Event Overview

MangoFarmSOL positions itself as a staking protocol on the Solana network, encouraging users to earn rewards for depositing SOL. The project gained attention from the Solana community by promising an airdrop on January 10th.

However, the promise of January 10 was never fulfilled. On January 6, 2024, MangoFarmSOL implemented an exit scam, transferring 13,512 SOLs deposited by users from the project contract (approximately US$1.26 million at the time), and deployed a malicious front end to mislead users to authorize "emergency migration" and here Approximately $60,000 was stolen. This is the largest exit scam we’ve uncovered so far in 2024.

Subsequently, MangoFarmSOL closed its social accounts and website.

Similar to the previously reported xKingdom incident, this incident once again highlights the risk of exit scams in the DeFi field, emphasizing the importance of users’ KYC on the team and the need to remain vigilant.

Scam Timeline

Step One: Lay the Trap

① On January 3, the project used social media KOL promotion to increase its credibility and attract more users.

On January 5, the team announced plans to conduct a MANGO token airdrop on January 10, and encouraged users to participate by staking SOL and recommending other users to receive additional rewards.

Users will start depositing SOL into the MangoFarmSOL contract from January 3 to January 7. Thanks to the MANGO token airdrop commitment and the impact of online marketing, the protocol’s TVL exceeded $1.3 million.

Step 2: Implement the scam

① Stealing contract funds: The MangoFarmSOL team launched a scam and deposited users into the Mango contract 13,514 SOL (approximately $1.26 million) was withdrawn to wallet 8ggvi.

First transaction: 135 SOL transferred from Mango contract (Bfg5SM) to wallet 8ggvi.

Second transaction: 13,379 SOL transferred from Mango contract (Bfg5SM) to wallet 8ggvi.

② Deploying a malicious front-end to commit fraud again: Subsequently, the team also used the previous theft incident to deploy a front-end containing malicious code under the guise of "emergency migration". The project's official social media account also posted the malicious frontend, tricking users into conducting transactions that resulted in the theft of approximately $60,000 in additional assets.

③ Complete disappearance: MangoFarmSOL subsequently deactivated its social media accounts and closed its official website, and began transferring funds.

Step Three: Fund Transfer

Mango Contract Stolen Fund Flow

① Initial Transfer: Mango There are a total of 13.5K SOL in the contract, worth approximately US$1.26 million. After being stolen, they were sent to the address 8ggvi....ejND7.

② Mixing & Conversion: Next, 9,458 SOL were sent to 4nBETJ to obfuscate the funding link; all SOL in 8ggvi and 4nBE were subsequently converted to USDC.

③ Cross-chain to Ethereum: These USDC are cross-chained from the Solana network to Ethereum through Wormhole, and these USDC are sent to 4 different ETH through multiple transactions address.

380k USDC cross-chain to 0x09e3 after 4 transactions

319k USDC cross-chain to 0xc504

##351k USDC cross-chain to 0x6898

217k USDC cross-chain to 0x8816

④ Final cleaning: After entering the Ethereum network, USDC is exchanged for ETH. The stolen funds were then laundered through Railgun (a privacy mixer) and exchanged through eXch (an instant exchange) to further obfuscate the funds.

Transaction example transferred to Railgun

Transferred to eXch’s transaction example

Flow of funds stolen by malicious front-end

① Integration and conversion: User assets stolen through the malicious front-end are integrated into SOL and then converted into approximately 5.86 million USDC.

② Cross-chain to Ethereum through Allbridge: These USDC are cross-chained to the Ethereum network through 2 transactions on Allbridge, and the address is 0x7ca...d8fec.

③ Final cleansing: USDC bridged to Ethereum is exchanged for 26 ETH. These funds are then deposited into FixedFloat multiple times.

Final distribution of stolen funds

The stolen funds across the chain to the Ethereum network are ultimately concentrated in three places:

eXch: About 292ETH
• Railgun: About 263ETH
• FixedFloat: About 26ETH

Experience Summary

MangoFarmSOL scam is 2024 to date The biggest exit scam ever. The scam’s tactics have similarities to the 2023 Harvest Keeper incident. Both projects deployed malicious front ends after the first theft to further steal user funds.

The MangoFarmSOL exit scam caused an estimated $1.32 million in losses, highlighting the urgent need for decentralized project scrutiny.

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